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Abstract
Of the available studies concerning pre-World War I Serbia, few have shown
more than a passing interest in that country's relations with the United States.
Indeed, no books have appeared on the subject, while only four articles examine
Serbo-American affairs during the kingdom's most dynamic decade, from 1903 to
1913. Though each is in some way valuable, these works fail to give an adequate
account of the relations existing between Serbia and the United States. Therefore
the following chapters explore Serbo-American affairs from the death of King
Alexander I Obrenovic in June 1903, to the conclusion of the Second Balkan War
(1913). Relying primarily upon American diplomatic dispatches, as well as upon
Serbian commercial data, this thesis concludes that contact between the two
countries was small (owing largely to America's traditional non-involvement in
European affairs), yet grew in significance towards the end of the ten-year
period.
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L Introduction
Of the available studies concerning pre-World War I Serbia, few have
shown more than a passing interest in that country's relations with the United
States. Indeed, no books have appeared on the subject, while only four articles
examine Serbo-American affairs during the kingdom's most dynamic decade, that
being from 1903 to 1913. 1 They include: Wayne S. Vucinich, "American-Serbian
Relations in 1903-1904," Danica Milic, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog
svetskog rata," Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD," and Dragan Zivojinovic,
"Jugoslovenske zemlje u politici Sjedinjenih Americkih Drfava do 1918. godine. "2
Though each is in some way valuable, these works fail to give an adequate account
of the relations existing between Serbia and the United States. Both Vucinich and
Popovic concentrate on the Belgrade coup of 1903, while Milic utilizes economic

1

A fifth scholar has written an overview of Serbo-American relations, though,
inexplicably, he fails to include the years 1903-13. See Ranko Petkovic, Jedan vek odnosa
Jugoslavije i SAD (Beograd: Vojnoizdavacki i Novinski Centar, 1992).
2

The above works are as follows: Wayne S. Vucinich, "American-Serbian Relations in
1903-1904," Slavia 15 (August 1940): 3-9; Danica Milic, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog
svetskog rata," /storijski Casopis 28 ( 1981 ): 129-35; Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD,"
Jugoslovenska revija za Medunarodno pravo VIII ( 1961 ): 80-98; Dragan Zivojinovic,
"Jugoslovenske zemlje u politici Sjedinjenih Americki Dr/,ava do 1918. godine," Zbornik Matice
Srpske 29 (1984): 49-68.
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records to paint a rather incomplete·picture of America's early interest in Serbia.
Only Zivojinovic treats the subject accordingly, but even then in a too general,
somewhat dismissive manner. In short, there exists a small yet important gap in
Balkan historiography. Therefore the following chapters will explore SerboAmerican relations from the death of King Alexander I Obrenovic in 1903, to the
conclusion of the Second Balkan War. The work as a whole, however, does not
represent a quantitative and/or structural analysis of America's pre-war Balkan
diplomacy. It is, rather, a chronological account of a short, though influential
period of Serbian history, one seen through the unique perspective of American
diplomatic observers.
To be sure, Serbian sources form an important part of this narrative, but the
diplomatic dispatches of various American functionaries are prominent for two
reasons. First, they reveal the common, day-to-day conduct of Serbo-American
relations, including consular affairs, inter-state commerce, and diplomatic
dialogue. Second (and perhaps more importantly), they provide an impartial and
altogether uncommon view of the most important events occurring in Serbia prior
to World War I. Of particular interest are the dispatches of Minister John 8.
Jackson ( 1903-04 ), as well as the wartime ( 1912-13) accounts of Belgrade Consul
Maddin Summers.
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Inasmuch as this work is devoted to a brief ten-year period, Serbia and the
United States were in contact as early as 1867. 3 Formal diplomatic intercourse,
however, did not take place until late 1881, when American and Serbian
representatives negotiated two separate agreements, one a treaty of commerce, the
other a consular convention. 4 The following year, both the American Senate and
the Serbian skupstina consented to ratification, and on 14 July 1882, the
agreements were signed by President Chester A. Arthur. The exchange of
ratification took place just four months later, on 15 November 1882.
The first American representative to present his credentials in Belgrade was
Eugene Schuyler, a New York native who also was accredited to the courts of

3

At this time de facto relations were established through the American consul at
Bucharest, Louis Czapkay. In Czapkay's absence, a Serbian representative named Kosta
Magazinovic was asked to oversee American interests. See Bogdan Popovic, "Pokusaj
uspostavljanja americko-srpskih odnosa 1867," Prilozi za knjiievnost, jezik, istoriju, i fiJ/klor 28
(1962): 49-57. See also Milan Bulajic, "Upostavljanje diplomatiskih odnosa izmedju KnjliZevine
Srbije i Sjedinjenih Americkih Driava 188 l, Zbornik istorijskog muzeja Srhije 19 (1982): 147187.
11

4

For the text of America's commercial and consular treaties with Serbia, see Department
of State, "Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of America and Serbia, and
"Convention between the United States of America and His Highness the Prince of Serbia,
Defining the Rights, Immunities and Privileges of Consular Officers, Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States ofAmerica, 1776-19./9, ed. Charles I. Bevans, vol.
12 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 1227-1237. On the Senate
ratification, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the
United States ofAmerica, vol. 23 (New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), 476-77. The
commercial treaty of 1881 was retained by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
11

11
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Greece and Romania. 5 As minister resident and consul-general, Schuyler took an
active interest in Serbian affairs. From 1882 to 1884, he promoted SerboAmerican commerce, and during that time enlisted the support of an American
entrepreneur named Edward M. Grant. Despite their disagreements, both Grant
and Schuyler enhanced America's commercial links with Serbia. In 1884 for
instance, American exports to Serbia were worth over 2.3 million dinars, the
highest level reached throughout the kingdom's forty year existence. After the
. death of Grant (as well as with the reappointment of Schuyler), trade between the
two countries assumed an irregular, somewhat neglected status.
The United States, it appears, was simply more interested in other areas of
the globe. Central and South America, China and the Pacific region, all were new
and promising grounds for expansion. 6 Therefore by 1890 the United States had
become an active participant in world affairs, yet it continued to view Europe as

5

Schuyler presented his credentials on 10 November 1882. See Department of State,
PrinCipal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chief\· ofMission, 1778-1990
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 164-66. With regards to
Schuyler and the advent of Serbo-American relations, see Milan BulajiC, 147-187, and Dragan
2ivojinovic, "Uspostavljanje diplomatskih i trgovinskih odnosa izmedju SAD i Srbije 18781881," Zbornik za Jstoriju 25 (1982): 31-50; Idem, Preg/ed, no. 216 ( 1982): 2-13.
_

6

Conceming America's foreign interests prior to World War I, see Walter LaFeber, The
Cambridge History ofAmerican Foreign Relations, vol. 2, The American Search for Opportunity,
1865-1913 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Lawrence E. Gelfand ed., Essays
on the History ofAmerican Foreign Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.,
1972).
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both decadent and dangerous, "with its balance of power, its rivalries, ... [and] its
constant threats of war." 7 Serbia, by association, was no dit1erent, positioned as it
was between the great eastern empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary. In
addition, Serbia was relatively remote, and its commercial prospects had yet to be
explored, let alone exploited. Few Americans travelled there, and even fewer
wished to accept a diplomatic post in Belgrade.
Between 1882 and 1903, no fewer than ten men were named the American
chiefs-of-mission, though not one chose to reside in Serbia on a regular basis. 8
Both economic and political affairs thus were handled by lower officials, most
often consuls or vice-consuls general, many of whom were not even American
citizens. 9 Until 1903, only a few chiefs-of-mission showed more than a passing
interest in Serbia, John B. Jackson among them.

7

Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1956), 310. See also Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 2d
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 201-75.
8

Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States
Chief5 ofMission, 1778-1990, 164-66. See also John D. Treadway, "Serbian-American
Relations: the First Quarter Century," Paper presented at the Serbian Academy of Sciences,
Belgrade, 25 March 1992, and Elmer Plischke, United States Diplomats and Their Missions: A
Profile ofAmerican Diplomatic Emissaries since 1778 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).
9

As to the duties of consular officials, see Charles Stuart Kennedy, lhe American
Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776-191./ (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1990). See also Henry E. Maddox, The Twilight ofAmateur Diplomacy (Kent, Ohio: Kent
State University Press, 1989).
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Appointed late in 1902, Jackson was an experienced foreign officer, who
came to the Balkans after a similar assignment in Berlin. 10 As envoy extraordinary
and minister plenipotentiary to the courts of Greece, Romania, and Serbia, Jackson
was in a unique yet useful position when confronted with the peninsula's myriad
entanglements. He could leave Serbia, tour neighboring kingdoms,
and conduct other business in the region without disrupting diplomatic ties.
This was especially helpful in moments of crisis, such as in June 1903, when a
palace revolution resulted in the death of King Alexander I Obrenovic. The
event marked a watershed in the history of modem Serbia, as Obrenovic,
somewhat Austrian in his leanings, was succeeded by Peter I Karadjordjevic,
a strict constitutionalist and supporter of Tsarist Russia. Over the next decade
Serbia would realign itself, undoing a string of unpopular moves that had been
initiated by its former monarch. According to one historian, in the years prior to
1903, Obrenovic:
carried out four state coups, abrogated three constitutions, and
named and dismissed twelve cabinets as he gyrated between
personal despotism and semi-constitutional rule.... In foreign affairs

0

A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Jackson entered the Foreign Service in
December 1890. He spent the greater part of his career in the Balkans, subsequently serving as
E.E. and M.P. to Montenegro and Bulgaria. In 1906, Jackson represented the United States at the
Olympic games in Athens; in 1912 he was a special representative to the coming of age ceremony
of Crown Prince Boris of Bulgaria.
'
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Alexander zigzagged between Russia and Austria-Hungary until
neither power believed nor supported him. Alexander concluded
that he could do precisely as he wished without heeding objections
or opposition. 11
In July 1900, the young king announced his intention to marry Draga
Masin, a widow ten years his senior. Those closest to him objected, citing the
need of a foreign princess, or at least someone of less questionable repute. Interior
Minister Djordje Gencic begged Alexander to reconsider, arguing "Sire, you
cannot marry her. She has been everyone's mistress, including minc." 12
Undaunted, Alexander soon fell under the control of Draga, a beguiling,
unscrupulous woman. Unable to prevent the marriage, the king's cabinet resigned
amidst widespread indignation. Even Alexander's father, the ex-King Milan I
Obrenovic, expressed regret, believing his son was "pushing Serbia into an
abyss." 13

llDavid MacKenzie, "A Military Coup Which Succeeded: Serbia May 29, 1903," Serbian
Studies 6 (Fall 1991): 55.
12

13

Ibid., 56.

Quoted in Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia Befll'een h'ast and West: the Hvents of 1903-190X
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954 ), 9. Milan had renounced his throne in 1889 for the
sum of two million dinars.
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Eventually the marriage spawned a plot by the officers' corps to assassinate
the couple, whom many viewed as an embarrassment to the Serbian nation. Blind
with love, Alexander
endeavored to transform Draga into a state cult. Regiments,
schools, and villages were named after her. Her brothers and
sisters were continually at the court and took part in formal
audiences and receptions. The queen's birthday, September 11,
was designated a state holiday. 14
To make matters worse, Draga thrice feigned pregnancy in order to solidify her
position as queen. When at last examined by foreign obstetricians, it was revealed
the queen was not pregnant, and, as many feared, sterile. The public was outraged,
and as a result, disaffection grew. 15
By late 1901, the planned conspiracy had come to involve over 120 civilian
and military officials. On two separate occasions they planned to remove the pair,
though for various reasons, their efforts had come to naught. When in 1903 it was
rumored that Draga's brother was to be named heir to the Serbian throne, a plan

ulbid., 12.
15

0ne of Jackson's predecessors, Charles S. Francis, stated in 190 l that "the present
situation .. .in Servia is most serious and that the people, especially the commercial interests,
regard with grave apprehension the future of the country." Despatches of the United States
Ministers to Serbia, 5 July 1900 - 31 July 1903, National Archives, Microcopy No. T-630.
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took shape. 16 Led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic-Apis, some twenty-eight army
officers stormed the palace in the early morning hours of 11 June. After a frantic
search they succeeded in killing both the king and queen, as well as a number of
prominent figures. A provisional government quickly formed, and by 15 June,
Serbia possessed a new king, Peter I Karadjordjevic.

16

Besides that of MacKenzie and Vucinich, a number of works in English examine the
coup of 1903. See Chedomile Mijatovich, The Royal Tragedy: Reing the Story of the
Assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga of Servia (London: 1906), and Herbert
Vivian, "A 'Glorious Revolution' in Servia," Fortnightly Review 79 (I July 1903): 67-75.

IL From Coup to Coronation,
1903-1904
As for the United States, the coup of 11 June caught Minister Jackson
completely unprepared. His first dispatch, sent nearly two days after the affair,
came to the State Department via the American embassy in Vienna. The reason for
this was that the regicides occurred when Jackson was between posts, travelling
aboard a Greek steamer to Trieste. Instead of proceeding directly to Belgrade,
Jackson stopped at the Austrian capital to wire Washington of his plans. "Unless
otherwise instructed," he wrote, "I shall go to Belgrade Monday and enter into
relations with the de facto Servian Government. ... Please send new credentials if
[the] mission is to be continued." 1 On 15 June he arrived in Serbia, the same day
on which Peter was elected king by the Serbian skupstina.
Jackson found Belgrade to be the most ambivalent of places, where the
murders had failed to elicit even the smallest expressions of" either horror or
regret. "2 He therefore felt that in Serbia there was "no such thing as public

1

Jackson to John Hay (Secretaty of State), Vienna, 13 June 1903, T-630.

1

Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 20 June 1903, T-630.
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opinion, and to the masses the personality of the King, the nature of the
Constitution, or the fact whether or not there is a constitution at all," was a matter
of "absolutely no importance. "3 Though he spoke at length concerning the
supposed apathy of the people, Jackson did not, however, offer a detailed account
of the coup. He wrote that Belgrade was full of special correspondents, and that
the story most likely had been reported in the American press.
Indeed, several American newspapers devoted space to events of 11 June.
Of these, the Pittsburgh Gazette and the Chicago Record-Herald were the most
attentive, as each city possessed a rather large Serbian population. The Gazette
claimed thunderously that the murders could "change the map of Europe," while m
a similar manner the Record-Herald insisted they were among the most "notable
assassinations in history." 4 Both publications expected a civil war, but like the

Washington Post, their editorials hoped the coup would not inspire "acts of
[foreign] intervention." 5 Few newspapers discussed the future of Serbo-American
relations, though the New York Times proffered its own advice as to what path the

tp;usburgh Gazette, 12 June 1903; Chicago Record-Herald, 12 June 1903.
5

Washington Post, 14 June 1903. Two days earlier, the /'o.\·r reported that "the Servians
seem to be as proficient in rioting at home as they are in this country."
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State Department should follow. If Peter chose to "scandalize mankind by
rewarding the murderers," it stated that Jackson (as a three-way representative)
should not break off relations, but "simply refrain from going there."<' The Sun of
New York cautioned President Theodore Roosevelt that "in the present instance it
would be the height of irony and in the poorest taste ... to telegraph the new King,"
especially since Peter had "attained the throne through an act of blood." 7 Echoing

The Sun, the Boston Daily Globe believed "it would not be proper to extend
congratulations to the new king," but that "since the United States and Servia have
never sustained close diplomatic relations" Roosevelt's position was "less
embarrassing than it otherwise would be. "8
The Chicago Chronicle insisted that though horrible indeed, the events in
Serbia "would not have any important effect on the interests of the United States."9
In like manner, The Cleveland Plain Dealer sardonically remarked that it doesn't

6

New York Times, 16 June 1903.

7

The Sun (New York), 12 June 1903.

8

Boston Daily Globe, 12 June 1903. The Globe stated on 13 June that the fate of Draga
"should be a sad warning for American heiresses who aspire to get too near the throne. The
bluest royal blood will brook no rivalry with the common herd, and the common people do not
trust their own origin."
9

Chicago Chronicle, 12 June 1903.
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seem to matter whether the ruling dynasty was "[one] vitch or 'tother." 10 The

Philadelphia Inquirer went a step further, maintaining that "the time has gone
when the civilized world would be aroused even by minor disturbances in that
section [of the world]." 11
It appeared, however, that the Inquirer was far too presumptive, especially
when the Great Powers were reacting with genuine, unabraded disgust. Their
indignation only intensified when Peter forbade any arrests or condemnations, an
understandable gesture considering that many of the conspirators held influential
positions within his government. Nevertheless, Jackson and the rest of the
Belgrade diplomatic corps continued to hope that "foreign comment ... [would]
ultimately be of some affect," and let it be known that they expected the dismissal
of those involved. 12 On 19 June, Jackson wrote:
Everything goes to show that the conspiracy was most carefully
planned and admirably carried out in all its details. The
provisional government assembled with suspicious promptness,
and the various proclamations are of such a character as to lead
one to believe that it had been prepared in advance .... Those

10

11

C/eveland Plain Dealer, 15 June l 903.

Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 June 1903.

12

Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 19 June 1903, T-630. The Belgrade diplomatic corps
consisted of representatives from the following nations: the United States, Great Britain, Fram.:e,
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Bulgaria.
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directly concerned with the attack ... are not at all ashamed, and
officers implicated in it act as guides through the palace and give
explanations with more or less evident pride. 13
The new monarch spoke of the conspirators in "complimentary terms," and
according to Jackson, both the National Assembly and the Metropolitan of
Belgrade "either directly or indirectly expressed approval" with their work. 14 The
conspirators also enjoyed a large measure of public sympathy, and were "extolled
by the army and the people as liberators of the country." 15
Nonetheless, Jackson understood that the Belgrade coup posed an enormous
threat to the regime it had brought to power. Indeed, most of the diplomatic corps
believed Peter to be a mere figurehead, devoid of authority, and wholly under the
influence of the conspirators in question. Serbia's new foreign minister, Ljubomir
Kaljevic, confided in Jackson that it "made little difference whether the new

13

Ibid. The provisional government consisted of ten members, four of which actively
participated in the murder of Alexander. They included: Jovan Avakumovic (prime minister),
General Jovan Atanackovic (minister of war), Djordje Gentic (minister of the finance), and
Colonel Aleksa Masin (minister of public works).
11

15

Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 18 June 1903, T-630.

Quoted in David MacKenzie, Apis: the Congenial Compirator (Boulder: East European
Monographs, I 989), 51.
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king ... [was] a man of great capabilities or not," though he himself was a old
Karadjordjevic supporter. 16
On 19 June, Jackson informed Secretary of State John Hay that Russia was
the first country to enter into relations with the Royal Government, though its
minister, Nicholas Charykov, was urging the punishment of the conspirators.
According to Charykov, Serbia was an independent nation, and to him, the
conspiratorial question was solely of domestic concern. In the interest of "peace in
the Balkans," he stated that "nothing should be done to weaken the authority of the
new king." 17 Russia, however, supported Peter for a far less benevolent reason.
The new monarch was a known Slavophile and proponent of Serb expansionism.
It was quite possible that he would sever Serbia's unusually close ties with AustriaHungary, first initiated during the reign of Alexander's father, King Milan
Obrenovic. Jackson informed Hay on 21 June:
The general impression seems to be that Russia has gained a
considerable advantage over Austria by her prompt recognition of
King Peter...[Austria has] been more interested in maintaining good
relations with the sovereign [Alexander I Obrenovic], while Russia
has paid more attention to the Servian people. The sons of the new
King are being educated in Russia, and his sympathies are supposed

16

Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.

17

Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21 June 1903, T-630.
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to be more with that country than they are with Servia's more
immediate neighbor. 18
Russia and Austria were, in fact, the only countries to be infonned officially of
Peter's accession, leaving other diplomats unprepared for his 25 June arrival.
Without personal letters of introduction (in Jackson's case, between Roosevelt and
Peter,) protocol demanded that foreign envoys neither meet with nor recognize the
new king.
Jackson's position therefore was somewhat anomalous, and on 20 June he
wrote that most of the other gentlemen "all had letters to the late King, and we
should all need letters for his successor. "19 Secretary of State Hay responded
promptly, instructing Jackson to remain relatively aloof, and to observe the actions
of the other consuls. "If the diplomatic body [is] unanimous you may act with
them," wrote Hay, "otherwise do not be in haste to enter into official relations. In
view of the recent horrible crimes it might be as well for you to remain for a while

18

Ibid. For a general overview of Russian policies toward Serbia, see Barbara Jelavich,
Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-191./ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Also of interest is Charykov's own work, Glimpses ofHigh Politics: Through War and Peace,
1855-1929 (New York: Macmillan, 1931).
19

Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 20 June 1903, T-630. According to one scholar, Peter's
regime appeared not to understand the accepted protocol, and in particular the need for formal
letters of accession. See Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD," 93.
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at one of your other posts." 20 To ascertain what he called "a unifonn course of
action," Jackson met with the representatives of some twelve countries the next
morning. 21
At the Turkish legation the emissaries agreed to show proper respect to the
new king, though none wished simply to ignore the regicides. Most would have
been ready, however, "to recognize the new King if he had notified their
sovereigns, instead of doing so only in the case of the Czar and the Emperor Franz
Joseph." 22
Jackson himself believed that Russia was following the proper course, and
if America had possessed any real interest in Serbia, he would have followed
Charykov's example. Both Russia and Austria, he stated, "abhor the murder of
King Alexander no less than does the rest of the civilized world, but nothing they
can do will bring him back to life, and there would appear to be nothing which
could be gained through failing to treat his successor with the customary respect. "2'
To this he added:

20

Hay to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 20 June 1903, Diplomatic Instructions of the
Department of State- the Balkan States, 1801-1906, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-77.
21

Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21June1903, T-630.

22

lbid.

23

Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.
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King Peter was chosen in a constitutional manner, and so far as the
Servian people can be said to have a will, it is the will of the
people that he should reign over them. As an American
republican, it seems to me proper that he should be recognized
promptly. 24
Nevertheless, Jackson refused to act without diplomatic credentials, the lack of
which forced him to leave Belgrade on 23 June. Accompanied by the Turkish
minister, he departed on an evening train for Athens. 25
America's immediate interests in Serbia, such as they were, thus fell under
the supervision of acting vice-consul Christian Vogeli, a Swiss citizen and
representative of the New York Life Insurance Company. In the past Voge Ii had
rendered much service to the Legation, but in Jackson's estimation, he frequently
expressed a bias "too great...[for] political matters."26 His wife was a Serbian, and
together they openly sympathized with Peter. To Jackson's chagrin, Vogeli draped
his office with bunting and other decorations in honor of the new king, though at
the entrance an American shield hung prominently.

25

For a brief survey of Jackson's activities in Athens, see Demetrios E. Peppas, "Relations
Between the United States and Greece, 1878-1908," Bulkun Studies 9 (1968): 354-358.
26

Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630.
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At the time, only one American was living in Serbia, Samuel Weiss, a
Hungarian immigrant employed by Vogeli. Besides insurance, both Weiss and
Vogeli concerned themselves with exports to the United States. According to
Jackson they "averaged about six envoices a year, but there were practically no
imports, such American articles as find their way into the country being brought
from Austria. "27

Table 1
Serbian Trade with the United States,
1903-1904
(in dinars)
Year

kg.

F,xports
value

1903
1904

70

1,000

kg

Imports
value

%

948,559
863,111

766,458
745,274

132
1.22

%

Source: Statistika spoljaJnje trgovine Kr. Srhije. 1903-190./.

Nevertheless, the Serb Ministry of Finance did keep a sufficient record of
goods imported from the United States. Though nearly all passed through
Austrian middlemen, in the decade prior to 1904, imports from the United States
were a respectable 9,303,758 kg. According to the Serbian Ministry of Finance,
their value came to just over 11.5 million dinars. To be sure, 1903 imports had

27

1bid.
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dropped to their lowest level in fifteen years (948,559 kg), but Serbia still managed
to purchase some 530,000 kg of coffee, 308,000 kg of cooking and mineral oils,
and 17,000 kg of machinery, all of which came from stateside producers.
Conversely, Serbian exports to the United States were almost non-existent, the lack
of a coastline, and inadequate transport treaties contributing to a low sea-faring
trade. What Serbia could export (mostly dried fruits and other agricultural
products), was sent to Germany, Britain, and Austria-Hungary, the latter claiming
over 80 percent of its trade in 1903-04.
To Jackson, the dearth of American commerce could be attributed to what
he considered half-hearted diplomacy. The absence of permanent ministers in each
of the Balkan capitals frequently resulted in missed opportunities, especially in
Romania, where oil and grain exports were among Europe's largest. 28 Jackson
believed that under the circumstances it was impossible "to satisfy himself or any

0n Jackson's attempts to improve American commerce with Romania see I. Stanciu,
''Considerations sur I' evolution des rapports commerciaux entre la Roumanie et Jes Etats-Unis d'
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one else, or to do much of anything towards advancing American commercial
interests. "29
Jackson was not the only representative, however, to criticize American
practices. By 1903, Serbia's prune export was the largest in the world, exceeding
that of the United States by almost 13,000 tons. 30 Some twenty years earlier, viceconsul Edward M. Grant had talked of "securing arrangements which [would]
throw the entire prune trade of Serbia into American hands," but to do so he
needed the "cooperation [of] the right kind of a House in the United States. "11
Such cooperation was not forthcoming, nor was an increase in America's
minuscule consular budget. In fact, both Grant and his successor Vogeli were
"honorary" vice-consuls, a term applied to unpaid functionaries.
Fortunately for Vogeli, his ultimate livelihood did not depend upon Serbian
exports to the United States. He performed admirably as an agent of New York
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Life, and in 1903 could claim over 1, 100 Serbian clients, a number which would
increase substantially in the coming decade. 32 The company's success was due in
large part to a lack of domestic providers, and for many years it would rank second
or third among a host of European firms. All told, New York Life handled over 20
percent of Serbia's life insurance policies from 1903 to 1904. 33
On 8 July, Jackson informed Hay that most European sovereigns had been
notified of Peter's succession, and that a number of ministers subsequently had
returned to Belgrade. "All this goes to show," wrote Jackson, that "etiquette has as
much to do as morality, with the action of the diplomatic corps in absenting itself
from the reception of King Peter." 3.i Jackson's dispatch prompted Second Assistant
Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee to write, "If etiquette settles it, why should we
not have a notification from Peter? Perhaps it will enable us to decide this knotty
point. "35 In a note to Secretary Hay, Adee stated:
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There can be only two valid grounds for the non-recognition of
King Peter. 1st, a conviction that he was accessory before the fact
to the murder of the late King. 2nd, an opinion that the virtual
reward of the murderers and their participation in the new govt. is
immoral. I hardly know what right we have to sit in judgement on
either of these charges. 36
Hay wrote in response, "I think your view of the situation is immensely correctbut Peter is a little slow- we can afford to wait. "37
On 18 July, Assistant Secretary Francis B. Loomis wired Jackson (who was
now residing in Bucharest) that it was best not to travel to Belgrade at that time,
and that before doing so he first should ascertain discreetly if Peter had sent a letter
notifying the President of his accession. If this was not the case, wrote Loomis,
Jackson was to be careful "not to invite such an action."' 8 As of 23 July, Jackson
had gathered no such information, and stated that he W'1s unable to do so without
officially consulting Peter's government. He ultimately felt that Vogeli was so
"entirely Servian in his sympathies" that he was of no use, and that the Russian
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minister Charykov, to whom he might write in ordinary circumstances, was "liable
to communicate with the Servian authorities." 39
While in Romania, Jackson and his family were entertained by King Carol
I, who tended to speak with feeling about the recent events in Serbia. According to
Jackson, the monarch had just signed new credentials for his minister at Belgrade,
though felt it necessary to resign from his post as honorary colonel of a Serbian
regiment. Carol did not, however, "feel at liberty to postpone longer the renewal of
diplomatic relations," especially when Serbia imported close to a million dinars
worth of Romanian goods the preceding year. 40
In early August, Jackson received a confidential letter from the Dutch
minister to Serbia (who likewise was accredited to Romania), informing him that
Peter had sent telegrams to all the European heads of state. "Either due to
forgetfulness or economy, no [such] telegram was sent to the President. ... [The
39
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs] thought of doing it the next day, then hesitated, ... then
decided merely to send an autograph letter."41 As this letter was in the course of
preparation, Jackson asked that he be accredited as soon as it was received.
Besides, wrote Jackson "it is not our practice to notify foreign governments of a
change in our President.. .. [Therefore] I do not think we should be too difficile"
with regards to King Peter. 42 In addition, he telt that the new monarch was acting
in such a way as to increase his popularity, and had shown little intention of
mixing in party politics.
Indeed, the reign of Peter would come to represent the culmination of
Serbia's struggle for parliamentary govemment. 43 Unlike his predecessors, Peter
was a strict constitutionalist, who held a deep respect for the basic principles of
democracy. He not only swore to uphold the new constitution, but also pledged
"to devote himself to the establishment of justice and freedom in Serbia, to the
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improvement of the economy, and to the modernization of the army."44 Of prime
importance, however, was his belief that political leadership was to be in the hands
of those who enjoyed a majority in the parliament.
One of the first acts of the provisional government was to reinstall the
skupstina elected in August 1901. In characteristic fashion, the Radical Party had
dominated the elections, winning 84 out of 130 seats. 45 Its return to power
virtually guaranteed the selection of Peter, whose own sentiments resembled those
of Nikola Pasic, Lazar Pacu, and other Radical leaders. The party itself enjoyed
overwhelming support, a fact alluded to by Jackson on 24 August.
The election of a new Skupstina takes place on September 8/2 I,
and it is expected that a Radical majority will be returned. This
will lead to further changes in the government, and if King Peter is
able to affect these changes in a peaceful, constitutional manner, it
is to be hoped that comparative tranquility-for a time at least- may
be the result. 46
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By late August, Jackson was certain that Peter was "winning the good
opinion of the people in his Capitol" and that he appeared "to have made a good
impression ... elsewhere in the country."-1 7 Foreign relations were also on the
upswing, demonstrated by the large number of representatives who had
reestablished contact with Belgrade. As matters stood, all the ministers formerly
accredited to Serbia (excluding the British, the Dutch, and the American) had
presented their credentials to Peter.
Though the United States also refused to accredit its minister, both Britain
and the Netherlands took much firmer positions regarding the conspiratorial
question. As referred to previously, the Dutch minister relocated to Bucharest,
while the mission of the British envoy, Sir George Bonham, was suspended
entirely. Charykov earlier told Jackson that as England was not directly interested
in the Balkans it could "act on purely moral grounds."-1 8 This was indeed the case,
but on 31 August, Jackson wrongly reported that Bonham would be re-accredited
after the elections, and that the Dutch minister would receive his credentials before
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long.

49

Whereas the United States based it reasoning on accepted protocol, neither

Britain nor the Netherlands was willing to expose its representative to what the
Foreign Office called "the necessity of having to shake hands with and to sit beside
a regicide. "50
Although Jackson did not insist upon such measures, he did show his
displeasure with a Serbian government largely "in the power of those responsible
for...the night of June 10th/I I th." 51 He speculated as to who indeed held power,
and on 13 September, wrote:
Generally the King appears to be trying to do his best in every way,
but it is an open question as to whether he is acting in a manner to
please those who actually rule .... One should not be surprised or
astonished at any news which may come from Servia, or at
anything which may happen in that country. 52
Indeed, Jackson sent his dispatch in the wake of a botched counterconspiracy, the
trial of which did not conclude until 26 September. It appears that a number of
~9The
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officers from the Ng garrison disapproved of the conspirators, who with the
dynastic change moved to fill all of the better civil and military positions. Led by
Captain Milan Novakovic, some twenty officers united under the slogan Mundire
dole, oni iii mi! ("Remove uniforms, they or we~"), protesting the conspirators'

corrupt, praetorian influence. 53
Novakovic and his fellow officers insisted upon a peaceful, judicial
intervention, frequently charging that the conspirators had violated their sworn
military oaths. They also stated that their movement was in no way directed at the
Karadjordjevici, leading many to believe that Peter himself was interested in
removing the regicides from his court. 5~ Nevertheless, wrote Jackson, "it has been
officially announced that as a constitutional sovereign, the King is bound to
respect the amnesty granted to the original conspirators by the Skupshtina." 55 In
the end, both Novakovic and his counterconspiracy were arrested, and mild prison
terms given to those involved.
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Though Peter refused to condemn the conspirators, they in fact were kept
out of a cabinet formed after the elections of 21 September. V6geli informed
Jackson that Serbia's new government, a split coalition of Radicals and
Independent Radicals, had prepared all letters announcing the accession of King
Peter, "but none [have been] sent away yet, and no decision has been taken if they
[will] send these letters through Diplomatic Agents, by post or if they ... [will be
sent through J special Envoyes. "5<' As Jackson was to leave for Athens in late
November, he requested that the State Department forward his credentials by
telegraph, with as little delay as possible." On 24 October, Adee instructed his
staff that since "Peter's notification may reach us soon," it was probably time to
"get the thing in shape, credential letter, etc. so that we can telegraph Mr. Jackson
as he requests." 57 Less than a month later, Jackson reported that a letter to
President Theodore Roosevelt had been sent to the Serbian minister at Berlin, and
from there it shortly would be transferred to Washington, D.C.
By 28 November, Adee was in possession of Peter's announcement, and
a formal reply from the President came on 11 December. Adee informed
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Jackson that the time for the presentation of these letters was up to him, but that he
should plan his visit to Belgrade "so that it may not be claimed to possess any
significance as a condonement by this government of the acts which so shocked
the sense of all civilized peoples." 58
Adee's concern was in fact that of the entire diplomatic corps, which
continued to insist that the conspirators be punished. In order to pressure the king,
both the Austrian and Russian ministers agreed to a "diplomatic strike," whereby
they would avoid any and all court functions. Other ministers followed suit, and
by January most had taken leave of Belgrade. They did not, however, break off
relations and according to Jackson their boycott was more social than political.
None of them wanted to come into personal contact with the
regicides, certain of whom still form a part of the household of
King Peter. In this household there have been several changes
lately, but there are even yet several adjutants and other members
of it who took an active part in the 'removal' of King Alexander. ... 59
Peter himself was forced to cancel a New Year's reception; the absence of foreign
secretaries and other attaches was apparently too great an embarrassment. Instead,
a centennial celebration for the Karadjordjevic dynasty was held in Topola, the
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home of Peter's famed grandfather, Karadjordje (Black George) Petrovic, who had
led a Christian uprising against the Turks in 1804. 60 As Peter was unwilling to
dismiss the conspirators, court functions therefore were limited to those oflocal, as
well as patriotic concern.
Serbia's opposition press also was urging "the necessity of ceding to the
opinion of Europe," deemed unanimous when the whole of the diplomatic corps
declined invitations to a court ball in February." 1 Prior to the event, Jackson stated
that there were "constant rumors of friction in governmental circles, and another
ministerial or worse catastrophy ... [was] thought possible at any time."r' 2 This was
indeed true, as the Grujic cabinet soon resigned due to inter-party bickering and
the "diplomatic strike" referred to above.
Peter at first turned to Stojan Protic, a Radical and former minister of the
interior, in hopes of forming a new cabinet. But when Protic refused, Peter had no
other option but to reinvest Grujic with the responsibility. 63 The ministerial crisis
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lasted more than a week, though the end result was a cabinet of noted personalities,
including Nikola Pasic (foreign minister), Lazar Pacu (finance), Ljubomir
Davidovic (education), and Radomir Putnik (war).
Although Grujic's cabinet was again free of conspirators, the diplomatic
corps continued to press Peter for their wholesale removal from court. After more
than a month's hesitation, Peter finally conceded, issuing a royal decree in which
the officers who had been given posts by the provisional government were now
appointed to various regiments and their places filled by those who were not
implicated in the conspiracy. Some in fact were promoted, but at last "the chief
objection of the Powers against renewing diplomatic relations with Servi a has been
removed. "64
Credentials in hand, Jackson was now able present himself to Peter, though
the State Department insisted that he use "cautious discretion."<> 5 On 6 May t 904,
he returned to Belgrade, and after meeting briefly with Foreign Minister Pasic,
submitted a written request for an audience with Peter. Eager to renew relations,
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the Serbian Foreign Office acted with considerable haste. "Within twenty four
hours my calls were returned," wrote Jackson, "and on the afternoon of May 7th I
received a communication in which it was stated that King Peter would receive me
on Monday, the 9th." 66
Jackson learned at or around this time that the new Russian minister,
Konstantin Gubastov, had been received with more ceremony than had heretofore
been customary. In order that "no false impression be created," Jackson let the
Serbian foreign office know that he expected his own reception to be "in
accordance with the new precedent." 67 This was a somewhat laughable demand,
considering that the United States showed a paltry concern for Serbia, as well as
for its political and economic well-being.
Nevertheless, on 9 May Jackson was met at his hotel by Peter's court
marshal, and taken to the palace in a carriage complete with outriders and a cavalry
escort. Once inside the courtyard, Jackson was attended to by over a dozen
adjutants and other court officials, while a military band incongruously played
"Hail Columbia." Soldiers lined the palace stairs, and after a presentation of arms,
Jackson was ushered into an audience with Peter. Upon the presentation of
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credentials, Jackson assured the king of the "best wishes of the President and of the
American Government for the prosperity of Serbia .... "68 Peter responded in kind,
stating that he was deeply touched, and that he would "neglect nothing which may
realize and facilitate a closer rapprochement between our two countries. "<• 9
After the exchange of statements, wrote Jackson, the conversation was of an
informal character, and refreshments were served according to Serbian national
custom. He again met with Pasic, then sat briefly with Peter, the crown prince, and
other members of the royal family.7') At length the king took leave, and Jackson
returned to his hotel in the same manner in which he had come. Relations thus
restored, he collected his belongings, then departed for Greece that evening.
Through the summer of 1904, Jackson tended to other Greek and Romanian
matters, but returned to Belgrade in September for Peter's coronation. As
instructed by Secretary of State Hay, he proceeded in the company of Charles
Wilson, a legation secretary who at times functioned as his charge d'affaires. They
arrived to find the city filled with visitors, and brightly illuminated in honor of the

68

lbid.

69

lbid.

As Peter was a widower, the royal family included two sons and a daughter, namely
George, Alexander, and Jelena.
70

From Coup to Coronation I 36
new king's coronation. The ceremony itself lasted over two and half hours, and
though "an unusual proceeding in the present age," wrote Jackson, it effectively
excited Belgrade's "oriental surroundings. "71 The next evening a dinner was given
for all chiefs-of-mission, followed by a theatrical production, a military review, a
court ball, horse races, and a mock battle. Jackson spoke briefly with Peter,
offering his congratulations to a man whose "satisfaction and contentment were
obvious. "72
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III. Pig Wars, Fakes, and Physicists,
1905-1911
Following Peter's coronation, Jackson informed Hay that unless something
unusual occurred, he would not return to Serbia until spring. He stated that he had
been given ample opportunity to speak with Peter, and that now, with the onset of
winter, it would be best for him to retire to Athens. It was a logical move,
considering that Jackson was aware of "an impending ministerial crisis," one
which threatened to disrupt the government for an indefinite period of time. 1
The crisis to which he was referring concerned the second Grujic cabinet, a
loose conglomeration of old and Independent Radicals who no longer could work
in unison. Their constant bickering had led Jackson to believe that Peter was much
"too constitutional," and in need of infinitely firmer policies.2 It appears that the
Independent Radicals, tired of what they regarded as Radical opportunism, were
decidedly against inter-cabinet cooperation. The situation came to a head in
December 1904, when Grujic lost even the support of his own party, the majority
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of which favored a more powerful figure at the helm. A subsequent re-shuffiing
lead to an all-Radical cabinet under the premiership of Pasic, who also retained his
portfolio as foreign minister. For the first time since his accession, wrote Jackson,
"King Peter has a homogeneous cabinet, and it is hoped that the result will be
advantageous as far as domestic matters are concemed." 3 The opposite was in fact
true, and by May 1905, Pasic himself would resign. Nevertheless, he was able to
sway Peter towards a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement, the result of which was the
famed Austro-Serbian "Pig War" of 1906-11.
Heretofore Serbia had been dependent upon Austria-Hungary for a great
majority of its commerce. Lacking sufficient outlets, it had gravitated toward
Vienna, in Jackson's estimation, "more or less from a sense of necessity.'.i Now
that Pasic and other Serb Slavophiles were in power, they openly endeavored "to
bring this state of affairs to an end. "5 By spring 1904, Serbia had entered into two
separate treaties with Bulgaria, one of which laid the foundations for an eventual
customs union. Jackson was highly skeptical, however, believing that "the
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practical Bulgarians" were willing to aid Serbia only as long as it was to "their own
economical and political advantage. "6 He also opined that if Serbia:
breaks with Austria-Hungary she is bound to become dependent
upon Bulgaria (and indirectly upon Germany) .... Under the
circumstances Bulgaria has nothing to lose and everything to gain
from a commercial understanding with Servia, while that country
can at best change one form of economic dependence for another. 7
Whatever the case, Serbia held firm in its belief that economic emancipation could
be achieved through Bulgaria. Twice in 1904 Peter met with the Bulgarian Prince
Ferdinand, and in the summer of 1905, a Serbo-Bulgarian customs agreement was
reached. It would take effect in March l 906, though Serbian officials asked that it
be kept secret until the conclusion of their own talks with Vienna.
Meanwhile, the American State Department informed Jackson that it
intended to create a second Balkan mission, thereby re-assigning him as envoy to
the courts of Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. The ministerships of Serbia and
Romania would continue to be under one legate, a presidential appointee by the
name of John W. Riddle. As Riddle was not scheduled to arrive in Belgrade until
the spring of 1906, it was suggested that Thomas Ewing Moore, Riddle's charge d'
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affaires ad interim, be introduced personally to Peter. Afterwards Jackson was to
present his own letter of recall, and to take leave of Belgrade entirely.
On 12 July, both Moore and Jackson attended a reception in honor of the
king's birthday, a hearty affair in which Peter offered the new minister his "sincere
expressions of good-will. "8 Moore then met with the diplomatic corps, and at
length was introduced to Serbia's new foreign minister, Jovan Zujovic. 9 There was
of course no mention of Serbo-Bulgarian affairs, though for some time, stated
Jackson, it was obvious that the two countries had formed an "anti-Austrian
combination. "10
The following afternoon Jackson arranged for an official audience with
Peter, who subsequently thanked him for "making closer the relations between the
United States and Servia." 11 The king then spoke with great interest regarding
America's Serb communities, and questioned Jackson as to the publication of
Serbo-American newspapers, such as San Francisco's Nezavisnost (Independence),
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New York's Srpski Rodoljub (Serbian Patriot), and Chicago's Ujedinjeno Srpstvo
(Serbian Union), three prominent publications of I 905. 12 When Jackson at last
departed he was given an autographed photo of Peter, ostensibly to commemorate
his brief, yet eventful stay.
Moore himself remained in Belgrade for another ten days, witnessing the
general elections of 23 July. He recorded that over 1,000 candidates were vying
for only I 60 seats; all told they comprised seven voter lists drawn from nine
different parties. To Moore, such a system of was curious indeed. He wrote:
Inasmuch as a good proportion of the Servian peasant-population
is illiterate, it is necessary to adopt a means of enabling the
electors ... to recognize the difference in the lists. They may only
vote for one party, that is to say choose one of the lists, and their
votes go to all named on the list selected.... Each party has its own
ballot box and they are distinguished by being of different colours.
At Belgrade, for instance, there were seven boxes, placed sided by
side, having all the colors of the rainbow. 13
The final returns gave the Independent Radicals a one-vote majority, and control of
the ruling skupstina. Unsurprisingly, the margin proved to be too narrow to
establish any real degree of cabinet stability. For the next eight months, the
12
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Independents struggled with Serbia's myriad crises, the greatest of which was the
country's souring relations with Austria-Hungary.
Late in 1905 Austrian authorities discovered that Serbia and Bulgaria were
planning to create their own customs union, one which would give Belgrade
additional transport and shipping privileges. Enraged, Vienna subsequently broke
off negotiations and by January 1906, it had closed its borders to Serbian
commerce. 14 The effect was immediate, and altogether severe. Between 1905 and
1906, Serbian exports to Austria declined by over 34.6 million dinars, and imports
by another 11 million. In like manner, trade with the United States declined
precipitously, and in 1906 the Serbian Ministry of Finance recorded an utter
absence of American imports. A plausible explanation appears to be that Austrian
intermediaries could no longer afford to transport American goods, especially
when Serbia began to impose higher tariff rates on the Dual Monarchy.
With the onset of the "Pig War," Serbia realized that its economic survival
rested on the procurement of alternative commercial outlets. To this end, Pasic's
second government enlisted the support of Russia, France, Italy, Bulgaria,
Romania, and Turkey, the latter of which granted transit rights to Salonika and a
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loading zone in its harbor. Thus by 1907 Serbia was well on its way to economic
recovery, demonstrated by an almost 20 percent increase in total commerce. Over
the next five years, trade with the United States would rise associatively.

Table 2
Serbian Trade with the United States,
1905-1911
(in dinars)
Year
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

kg.

779
1,301,508
2,081,305
2,673,258
2,544,007

Exports
value

2,600
1,985,500
3,005,090
3,867,370
3,609,310

%

2.71
3.23
3.93
3.08

Imports
value

%

942,207

1,298,877

2.03

299,434
524,490
931,637
1,080,666
1,729,389

186,011
473,970
869,960
1,011,259
2,135,672

0.26
0.63
118
119
1.85

kno·

Source: Statistika .\po/ja.\:nje trgovine Kr. Srb!je. 1905-1911.

Starting at a meager 186,000 dinars in 1907, the value of imports from the
United States peaked at a sizable 2.1 million in 1911. Though they continued to
represent a small portion of all Serbian imports, goods from America were
consequently of greater value than those purchased from Romania, Bulgaria, or
Greece. What is most surprising, however, is that during this period Serbia
managed to increase its own exports to the United States. From 1908 to 1911,
Serbian exports averaged over 3.1 million dinars per year, a number which
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exceeded that of the previous twenty years combined. While coffee continued to
be the most imported of American goods, Serbia exported large quantities of dried
fruit and copper. 15
The Austro-Serbian "Pig War" was of great interest to the American
shipping industry. First, in 1905-06 the American Car Company explored the
viability of constructing a train car factory at Nis. 16 Then in 1907, the firm Balston
Brown approached the Serbian government regarding the construction of railway
lines, and in particular, of a much coveted route to the Adriatic. Like those of
other nations, American businesses hoped to capitalize on a Danube-Adriatic
railway, that would circumvent Austria, as well as its projected train line though
Novi Pazar. 17 Perhaps the most interesting of proposals came in 1909, when the
American Engineering Company offered to construct a canal between the Danube
and the Aegean Sea. As the canal was to traverse Turkish territory, Serbian

15
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officials refused to entertain the proposal without an agreement with
Constantinople.
In the end, none of the above plans was acted upon, though their very
existence revealed that American firms were aware of what Moore called "a
great new field, rich in trade possibilities." 18 Nevertheless, without direct
commercial links, Serbia and the other Danubian countries were relatively
inaccessible to the United States, especially when business there could "only be
availed of with caution and through trustworthy agents on the spot. "19 Christian
Vogeli was one such agent, and from 1905 to 1910, New York Life averaged
almost 1600 insurance policies per year. 20 Needless to say, other American
companies were less venturous, neglecting "trade opportunities entirely in these
countries of far Eastern Europe."21
On 23 April 1906, Minister Riddle at last arrived in Belgrade, assuming his
post after similar work in Cairo. He met with Peter on 7 May, and after brief
introductions the two men spoke casually regarding the recent San Francisco fire.
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The king expressed deep regret, though at the same time he was confident that
"American energy would soon efface all traces of material damage. "22 He did
not, however, touch upon any of the "unpalatable questions" affecting Serbian
affairs. 23
The first such question regarded trade relations with Austria-Hungary. In
early 1906, Serbia was feeling the baneful effects of an imposed economic
embargo. Not satisfied with simple tariff concessions, Vienna insisted that Serbia
agree to a series of irrelevant conditions, mostly regarding bank loans and
proposed military contracts. Riddle at once stated that these conditions were "so
onerous that no [Serbian] ministry could accept them and still stand. "24
Nevertheless, Austrian officials held firm, believing that if the skupstina refused
their proposals, the Serbs would soon "suffocate in their own swine fat. "25
The second and third questions were in themselves connected. First, Great
Britain and the Netherlands still refused to re-accredit their envoys until all of the
regicides had been removed. Since none of them were on duty at court, this meant

22
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retiring those who had been reassigned (and even promoted) to posts outside of
Belgrade. In order to do so, Peter would have to confront a conspiratorial faction
that had come to exert an enormous amount of influence, at times affecting
"military appointments, [the] procurement of military supplies and credits, and in
general any basic issue before the government. "26
Indeed this was no small task, though Peter ultimately had the support of
Nikola Pasic, who was once again head of a new cabinet. According to Riddle:
The prime minister is desirous of settling the question
forthwith, as he expresses the opinion that his party would
triumphantly carry the approaching elections if it could go before
the country with the prestige of having solved this question, for
even the peasants feel strongly on the subject and realize the
stigma which is cast upon Servia in the opinion of foreign
nations. 27
Thus in collusion with Pa.Sic, Peter decided to retire the remaining conspirators. 28
On 16 May 1906, Pasic informed Great Britain that the final six regicides
(Popovic, Masin, Misic, Lazarevic, Kostic, and Atanackovic) had been pensioned
off and would not return to their positions. The Foreign Office responded
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favorably, and on 11 June, exactly three years after the Belgrade coup, AngloSerbian relations were restored. 29 It was a major diplomatic breakthrough, though
increased Serbian ties with Britain were anathema to Austrian interests. 30
By mid-1906, the great alliances of Europe had all but materialized; for this
reason Germany and Austria feared British, French, Italian, and Russian influence
over Belgrade. Led by a determined foreign minister, Count Alois Lexa von
Aehrenthal, the Dual Monarchy therefore began to pursue a more active policy in
the Balkans. 31 The Austro-Serbian "Pig War" was the first step, followed by plans
to construct a railroad connecting the Sanjak of Novi Pazar with Salonika. By
doing so, Aehrenthal hoped to isolate the states of Serbia and Montenegro, thereby
ending any greater-Serb or Yugo-slav aspirations. 32 In fall 1908, Vienna made its
most aggressive move to date. After brief negotiations with the Russian foreign
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minister Alexander Izvolsky, Aehrenthal announced the annexation of BosniaHercegovina. 33
The ensuing crisis nearly brought Europe to war, though at length Serbia
was forced to accept the Austrian acquisitions. Nevertheless, for Pasic and other
Serb leaders the annexation of Bosnia was an unpardonable act that threatened the
very existence of the Serb nation. For over five months they refused to recognize
the annexation, claiming that: ( 1) it was illegal under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin,
and that (2) ifthe Great Powers were willing to accept such a change, then Serbia
should be entitled to some sort of territorial compensation, most likely the Sanjak
ofNovi Pazar.
In contrast, the United States accepted the annexation with great
indifference, maintaining that as a non-participant (in both the Congress of Berlin
and in Balkan affairs at large) it had little business expressing an overt, potentially
complicated opinion. To this end the State Department instructed Riddle's
replacement, a Delaware native by the name of Horace G. Knowles, that he should
33

Known as the famous "Buchlau Bargain," Izvolsky and Aehrenthal agreed that Austria
could annex Bosnia-Hercegovina if the Turkish Straits were reopened to Russian warships. For a
general overview see Barbara Jelavich, The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Company, 1969), 152-153. Also of interest is Bernadotte Schmitt's The
Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; reprint, New
York: Howard Fertig, 1970), 19-29 (page references to reprint edition); and John D. Treadway's
The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-19 J.I (West Lafayette:
Purdue University Press, 1983 ).

Pig Wars, Fakes, and Physicists I 50
remain in Bucharest, thereby dispelling "any active [American] interest in the
situation." 34 Nevertheless, Knowles followed the Serb reaction closely, reporting
that the entire population was "thoroughly aroused," and insisting upon "an
immediate war with Austria." 35 He ultimately felt, however, that the Serbians:
are as excitable as they are poor and helpless.... They will parade
through the cities, make violent speeches and close the schools for
a few days, but, they will not make war against Austria. Before
this dispatch reaches you [Secretary of State Elihu Root], you will
have heard, in all probability, the passing of the war cloud from
over Servia. 36
Meanwhile, America's Serb communities were expressing a similar
indignation. On 11 October 1908, the Committee of the Servians of New York
petitioned President Theodore Roosevelt "to use the influence of his exalted
position [so] that the rights of the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina are protected. "37
The Servian National Committee of San Francisco hoped that the United States, as
the "exemplar of fair dealing and justice among nations of the earth," would
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"intercede on behalf of Bosnia and Hercegovina .... "38 A meeting of Pennsylvania
Serbs, all of whom had fled to America from "the tyranny of Austria," asked the
President to "offer aid to their brethren ... [in order] to free and unite all Serbs." 39
The White House also received petitions from Serbian groups outside the
United States. Writing "in the name of friends in the Servian Parliament" two
London based nationals (giving only the names Lazarovich and Hrebelianovich)
informed Roosevelt that:
the sudden and arbitrary annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina
has robbed the populations of those Servian lands of all hope of
national development and liberty and is the first step towards the
annihilation of the independent Kingdom of Servia. Our very
existence as a people is in peril. 40
To this they added a brief appeal, imploring Roosevelt to aid a people "whose own
watchword" was a familiar "give me liberty or give me death. "41
An interesting note from the Committee of Servi an Women (Belgrade) was
sent to Edith Roosevelt, and then to First Lady-Elect Helen Taft. Written by
Nadegeda Petrovic, it stated:
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We believe Madame, that you may be induced to interest the noble
and liberal minded women of the United States of America on
behalf of the said Committee of Servian Women, in order that they
too may raise their voice in the cause of Justice and Liberty and
save these two countries [Bosnia and Hercegovina] from slavery,
which has been abolished in the United States of America more
than half a century ago. 42
Though Roosevelt failed to answer the petition, Taft ultimately expressed
sympathy with the Committee and their struggle for Bosnian independence. By
doing so she incurred the wrath of the Austrian consul, who questioned President
Roosevelt as to the matter on 28 December 1908. Claiming ignorance, he
promised to correspond with the Tafts at the earliest possible moment. The
following day he wrote to them, stating:
I know nothing of the incident, but I am glad to tell you what I
think are undoubtedly the facts in the Balkans. No better bit of
governmental work has been done in Europe than the work of the
Austrians in governing Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is objected to
by precisely the type of individual who objects to our having
interfered in the Philippines, Santo Domingo, and Panama. I need
hardly tell you that while Serbia has done better as an independent
power than she did under Turkey, she has done hideously,
nevertheless. The present King is the beneficiary of an
assassination of the most atrocious kind, and the real authors of the
assassination have never been punished. I hope and believe that
the Southern Slavs will ultimately grow able to stand by themselves
and do as well as the Bulgarians and Romanians have done~
but at present independence or annexation to Serbia would work
for Bosnia and Herzegovina very much as [William Jennings]
42

Petrovic to Edith Roosevelt, Belgrade, 16 November 1908, M-862.

Pig Wars, Fakes, and Physicists I 53
Bryan's theory of immediate independence would work for the
Philippines. 43
It is ironic that the person to whom the Serbs so earnestly appealed was a

firm believer in Austrian administration. In addition, Roosevelt thought that
Serbia was the worst governed of all the Balkan states (excluding Turkey), and in
1911 wrote that "it must be pretty awful to be connected with the Serbian royal
family!"4-1 Such opinions aside, neither Roosevelt nor the United States
government wished to get involved in a dispute so removed from American
interests. Nevertheless, a few American newspapers suggested that he take a more
prominent role in the crisis, possibly through an international conference like the
one held at Algeciras some five years earlier. Best summarized by the Indianapolis

Star, these editorials felt that it was a great chance for Roosevelt "to make a hit by
restoring peace in the Balkans. "45 But for the most part, American papers tended to
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echo the Washington Post, which held that as "a friend of all nations concerned,"
the United States would not allow itself to be "drawn into their quarrels. "46
Eventually, Knowles departed Bucharest on 4 February 1909, some two
months before the crisis had passed. 47 Therefore the United States was without an
envoy to Serbia, at a time, wrote one official, when Europe was undergoing
"kaleidoscopic changes."48 By the beginning of March war appeared so imminent
that the American charge d' affaires in Bucharest inquired as to whether the State
Department needed a temporary representative in Belgrade, ostensibly to give "an
inside historical account of what may transpire there. "49
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The State Department ignored his suggestion, while the next two
appointees, Huntington Wilson and Spencer F. Eddy, failed even to make the
journey to Belgrade. Both men were given the title envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary, though for whatever reason they failed to accept their
missions. 50 On 25 September 1909, John R. Carter received the appointment,
finally presenting his credentials over seven months later, in May 1910. For the
next year Carter served as E.E. and M.P. to the courts of Romania, Serbia, and
Bulgaria, and in turn witnessed two of the most bizarre episodes in the course of
Serbo-American relations. 51
The first occurred in the spring of 1910, when Serbia's envoy to Paris,
Milenko Vesnic, issued a sharp denial that Crown Prince Alexander and his
brother George were seeking wealthy American brides. Though the story first
appeared in a 1908 edition of the New York Times, it soon was picked up and
reprinted in newspapers throughout the country. It held that a Russian general
named "Tcherf Spiridonovitch" was acting as a matrimonial agent, and that he
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diligently was searching for interested American families. When Vesnic caught
wind of the reports, he immediately dismissed them as false. "Should either of the
future princes at any future time go to America," he stated, "it will be only to visit
the country and study institutions which are especially interesting in Serbia, the
most democratic kingdom in old Europe." 52
The second event occurred some six months later, when a man by the name
of Stefan Dusanovitch filed a complaint with the State Department, demanding
that a New York justice of the peace make "a complete and immediate apology" for
serving him with an official court summons. 53 Styling himself the "Prince of
Rashka," Dusanovitch believed that he possessed a kind of diplomatic immunity
under which he was exempt from legal proceedings. The Department's Diplomatic
Bureau initially had no idea who Dusanovitch was. Someone suggested that he
had ties to the ruling house of Petrovic-Njegos in Montenegro, but when this
proved false, the letter was passed on to Second Assistant Alvey A. Adee.
Adee at once recognized Dusanovitch as that "lunatic" who had earlier
approached the Department with claims to the Serbian throne. Amazing as it may
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seem, Dusanovitch was only one of numerous pretenders seeking recognition
through the American government. In June 1903, the New York Times reported
that a Brooklyn wine merchant named Louis B. Cociancich had papers proving he
was king. 54 Though nothing came of it, another would-be monarch emerged in
1905 from of all places, County Line, Iowa. His name was Theodore M. Streu,
and after corresponding directly with the Belgrade consulate, insisted that
Secretary of State Root take "such further action [in naming him king] as may be
considered expedient. "55
Of course nothing came of these proposals, though Dusanovitch,
Cociancich, and Streu elicited stem recriminations from America's Serb
community. In November 1912, two of its leaders, Paul H. Pavlovitch and Milan
Yeftich, issued a statement condemning them as "fakers" who were "shamelessly
abusing the name of the Serbian people." 56 They went on to state that due to some
basic historical facts, "no honest man would to-day even think of calling himself a
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Servian noble." 57 Nevertheless, Dusanovitch remained quite vocal in his claims,
and even went so far as to enlist a "Comptroller of the Household" named G. W. de
LaPoer Browsman.
It was Browsman who in 1911 asked that "His Imperial Highness" be

appointed as a volunteer aid to Major General W. H. Carter of Fort Sam Houston,
Texas. According to Browsman, Dusanovitch was "most anxious to see active
service with the troops of the United States," and hoped that the Department would
answer his request "with propriety." 58 After a few more isolated (and ultimately
unanswered) letters, both Dusanovitch and Browsman faded into obscurity.
Just over a month later, a more famous person would enter the realm of
Serbo-American relations, this time with the proper recognition of the United
States government. His name was Michael ldvorsky Pupin, an eminent physicist
and inventor, and in May 1911 Peter appointed him as Consul-General to both the
United States and Canada. 59 Apart from Nikola Tesla, Pupin was the most
celebrated of Serbian-Americans, having immigrated from the Banat region of
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Vojvodina in 1874. His scientific work dealt primarily with electromechanics, and
as a professor at Columbia University, Pupin held the patents to over thirty
inventions. 60 As an author, speaker, and philanthropist, Pupin was a conscious
proponent of Americanization, and by the mid 1920s his autobiography, From

Immigrant to Inventor, was a popular text in American high schools. 61
Nevertheless, Pupin maintained close ties with America's Serb communities, and
after 1908, became one of its most prominent members. 62 Before then he was
politically inactive, though with the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he helped
to found an American protest organization called the Srpski Narodni Centralni
Odbor (Serbian National Central Committee).
Expecting a war with Austria, Pupin's committee raised large sums of
money for the Red Cross organizations of both Serbia and Montenegro. Though
the crisis passed, Pupin remained a prominent fixture in the political life of
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Serbian-Americans, and in 1911 received word that he had been named Serbia's
Consul-General in New York. The post itself was honorary, and although Pupin
was given no salary, supplies, or budget, he opened an office with his own funds
that year. 63 The end result was entirely beneficial for Serbia. With the outbreak of
the Balkan Wars in 1912, Pupin became a vociferous supporter of the Serbian
cause. For the next two years he would perform various functions for the Serbian
government, including the issuance of passports to immigrants who had come to
America from Macedonia, Kosovo, and other regions liberated from Turkey.
During World War I he was particularly active, funding Red Cross detachments,
giving speeches, and organizing volunteers for transport to Europe.
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IV. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913
The year 1912 was of pivotal interest to the Balkan states, and for Serbia it
signified its final liberation from the Ottoman Empire. Though an independent
kingdom since 1878, Serbia had long coveted the Turkish territories surrounding
Ohrid and Skopje, collectively known as "Old Serbia." It was here that the
powerful Nemanjic dynasty had established a medieval empire, and to a majority of
Serbians, this area was unquestionably Serbia irredenta. 1 Expansion southward
was given further impetus with the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. If
Serbia was unable to secure land from Austria-Hungary, it assuredly could snatch a
province or two from the moribund Ottoman Empire. To achieve this end,
Belgrade officials entered into a series of separate agreements with Bulgaria,
Montenegro, and Greece, the aim being to partition the European holdings of
Turkey. Ironically enough, this "Balkan League" of 1912 was borne of an idea
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defensive in nature. Supported by Tsarist Russia, the League originally fonned
with the goal of keeping an aggressive Austria in check. 2 It soon became clear,
however, that the Balkan states could not be controlled by their sponsor, and in the
fall of 1912, each government was making final preparations for war.
Though Serbia had become increasingly belligerent towards Turkey, this
had not always been the case. Prime Minister Milovan Milovanovic was for a
number of years an ardent Russophile, and until his death in July 1912, Serbia
followed the St. Petersburg line. In doing so, he promoted defensive treaties such
as the one fonned between Belgrade and Sofia in March 1912, which pledged each
to take joint action against any nation that tried to "annex, occupy, or even
temporarily ... invade" any Balkan province under Turkish rule. 3 Obviously directed
at Austria-Hungary, the treaty also called for Russian arbitration in the settlement
of future territorial disputes.
To be sure, Serbia and Bulgaria held lengthy discussions concerning the
future of Turkish Macedonia. Both countries wished to annex all or part of this
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territory, and by mid 1912, they seemed willing to wage war for it. Although
Serbia appeared slightly more aggressive with the death ofMilovanovic, the
American envoy, John B. Jackson, did not think that the new cabinet would
"initiate any [sort of] adventurous policy."4 Nonetheless, by 15 September the
United States consul to Belgrade, Maddin Summers, reported that "war was being
clamored for on every side," and that the Serbian government had issued a
prohibition on the export of wheat, com, and other foodstuffs deemed necessary
should conflict arise. 5 Two weeks later Peter declared a moratorium on all private
contracts, just one, stated Jackson, of the "extraordinary appropriations" passed to
cover the cost of mobilization and war. 6
Such measures notwithstanding, the Serbs failed to engage Turkey until 17
October, nearly ten days after their allies, the Montenegrins. Within a short period
of time, however, the Serbian army had crossed the border into Macedonia, and on

4
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5
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6
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24 October it scored a decisive victory at Kumanovo. 7 By now war had opened on
three fronts, and the outnumbered Turks were retiring quickly from Europe.
Casualties were great on all sides, and by the end of the month, reported Summers,
Belgrade was in "great need of medical and pecuniary assistance."8 In midNovember he reported that the number of wounded in Serbia was approaching
16,000, and that the city's schools, universities, and other buildings were acting as
make-shift hospitals.
In addition, Red Cross representatives were arriving from countries
throughout Europe, and soon they established base camps in cities such as
Belgrade and Nis. Russian and German volunteers were especially prominent,
though Summers believed that "no little surprise and regret is felt here" at
America's failure to help. 9 He also thought that
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if only from a purely commercial standpoint, we should respond at
once to the suffering.... In recent years a flourishing commerce has
grown up with the United States, and this has brought the people
here into a closer contact and appreciation of the American
people .... Anything which we might be able to do [therefore] would
be deeply appreciated ... 10
Indeed, one of the cities for which the Balkan allies were fighting, Salonika, was a
major outlet for goods to and from the United States. In 1912 alone, Serbian

Table 3
Serbian Trade with the United States,
1912-1913
(in dinars)
kg.

Exports
value

%

kg.

Imports
value

%

2,736,000

3,921,600

4.65

911,321

1,283,072

1.20

Year

1912
1913*

Notes:(*) Statistics for 1913 were incomplete due to the Second Balkan War.
Source: Statistika .\poljaJnje trgovine Kr. Srhije. 1912.

exports to America were worth nearly four million dinars, though imports from the
United States suffered considerably from Serbia's wartime expenses. Nevertheless,
the war itself peaked the interest of American manufacturers, and on three separate
occasions Summers reported that bids were being submitted for both equipment
and supplies.

10

1bid.
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According to Jackson, however, the entire effort to equip and mobilize the
Serbian army had left it ill-prepared, and "without sufficient time to fit up hospitals
and to make other sanitary preparations." 11 The American Red Cross eventually
responded, authorizing Summers to make a one thousand dollar contribution to
Prime Minister Pasic, who subsequently conveyed "his expressions of greatest
gratitude. "12
By mid-December, the American Red Cross had sent upwards of ten
thousand dollars to Serbia, just one of five belligerents to which funds were given.
Summers believed that the money would be better spent if it went directly to the
families of those at war, particularly when the country was "depleted ofmen." 13 He
also stated that
practically one tenth of the whole population responded to the call,
and were put either into the field or on guard duty .... If the same
percentage responded to a similar call in the United States, we
would be confronted with the task of officeering, arming, and
supplying almost l 0,000,000 men. The same applies to the other
Balkan States, and we can also imagine the temporary misery that
would result to the homes of ten million men in a bloody fight for
their country. 14
llJackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 5 November 1912, M-357.
12
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Despite repeated requests on the part of Summers, George W. Davis, the
chairman of the American Red Cross, refused to accept the proposal. In his
opinion, the organization's charter, namely the 1864 Treaty of Geneva, took
cognizance only "of the sick and wounded of armies in time ofwar." 15 Therefore
the American Red Cross would not contribute money unless Summers assured him
that it would go directly to the Serbian government. It was then up to Pasic and
the Serbian Red Cross to apply aid where "it would seem ... the most expedient." 1r'
Over the next few weeks, Summers would experience even more problems
with the American Red Cross. For some time Davis refused to recognize or
provide for a group of American post-graduate surgeons who had come to Serbia
from Berlin. 17 These men were skilled volunteers, and desirous of new and
sanitary equipment, they unsuccessfully appealed to Davis. The reason given was
that as an "invariable rule" the American Red Cross did not extend recognition to
surgeons who "were not specifically retained or employed" by the organization
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itself 18 To Summers, the Red Cross was making a terrible mistake, and he saw no
reason why these men should not be afforded the necessary aid. Besides, Serbia
was in dire need of surgeons, and it had been difficult enough to recruit and station
the four he did have. Three other volunteers had left in less than a week, due
mostly to what Summers called a "lack of grit." 19
The need for medical assistance became all the more urgent with the failure
of a winter armistice on 23 January 1913. Prior to that time, the Ottomans had
agreed to relinquish all of their territory west of Enez (Enos) and Midye (Midia),
virtually the whole of European Turkey. Negotiations ended, however, when a
Young Turk revolt overthrew the Turkish government, and by February 1913, war
had resumed on all fronts. According to Summers, the problem was not only that
there were more wounded, but that a majority of Red Cross units had gone home
when the armistice was declared. Therefore the four American surgeons were
more valuable than ever, and as a consequence, each was given command of his
own field hospital. But, wrote Summers, they lacked "uniforms, operating clothes,

18

19

Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 April 1913, M-357.

Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 12 April 1913, M-357. According to
Summers, the three who left lacked a "willingness to undergo, as others have done, some
inconvenience to relieve human suffering." Contrary to his opinion, it appears that the surgeons
were afraid that they would be infected with cholera.
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some instruments, bed linen, oil clothes, a change oflinen for the wounded,
interpreters, nurses, and in short, almost everything that a well organized unit
should have .... "20
At length Davis recognized the group, though he did so only two days before
the conclusion of a second armistice. Final peace negotiations opened on 20 May, and
ten days later the war officially ended with the Treaty of London. The victors soon
began to squabble over the division of Macedonia; the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks each
claiming territory the others wished to possess. Before the Russians could mediate a
peaceful settlement, the Bulgarian general staff decided that it would be better to
strengthen its position through war. On 29 June, the Bulgarians attacked both the
Serbian and Greek lines, thus initiating a second Balkan conflict. 21
In short, the war was a disaster for Bulgaria. Already outnumbered by the
Serbs and Greeks, within ten days Bulgaria had to face the additional armies of
Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey. Nevertheless, its battles for Macedonia were
among the bloodiest of both wars, and for a brief time the Bulgars were in
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occupation of Serb territory. On 8 July, Summers reported that the Bulgarians had
taken the Serbian town of Knjazevac, in the process committing a number of
"cruelties" towards the Serbian wounded. 22 "Some of the men had their ears cut
off," wrote Summers, "some were burned alive, and the flesh [was] cut from
others. "23 In contrast, the consul recorded that the Bulgarian prisoners were "well
treated by the Servians," and that the king himself visited those who were
imprisoned in Belgrade.2"~
Summers's report was quite similar to that of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, an organization which sponsored a fact-finding mission to the
Balkans in mid-1913. Included in this mission was an American named Samuel T.
Dutton, a renowned professor of education at Columbia University. 25 According to
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one of Dutton's sources, the Bulgarian attack on Knjaievac was "not a case of mere
pillage ... [it was] something worse; something stupefying."26
In its final report the mission detailed instances of the "really savage and
barbarous side of the second war," complete with mutilations, disembowelings,
and beheadings. 27 Perhaps the most striking example concerned a Serbian soldier
who was captured, then "put on a spit and grilled." 28 This is not to say that the
report was entirely favorable to the Serbs. In fact, Consul Pupin felt that it was the
result of "an Austrian intrigue," and that accounts damaging to the Serbs were
intended to "blacken the Servian name throughout the civilized world. "29
Whatever the case, the report did state that Serbia experienced far more
casualties in its war with Bulgaria than it had in the preceding war with Turkey.
Indeed, Summers could attest to the enormous influx of sick and wounded soldiers,
a great many of whom were dying for lack of attention. The situation appeared so
bleak that Summers began to organize teams of Serbian-Americans to assist the
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doctors already present in Belgrade. He also contacted the New York Herald of
Paris in hopes that the newspaper would call for the support of doctors throughout
Europe.
The appeal caught the attention of Lafayette Young, a fonner U. S. senator
from Iowa who was vacationing in Karlsbad. 30 A well-known philanthropist,
Young infonned Summers that he was coming to Belgrade, and that he wanted to
help in any way possible. Upon his arrival, both Summers and Young travelled to
the front-line hospitals at Nis. There they recorded that operations were perfonned
without anesthetics, though in nearby rooms the wounded were "calmly and
stoically awaiting their tum." 31 They met briefly with each of the surgeons, and
after distributing supplies, cigarettes, and other equipment, they boarded a return
train to Belgrade. "As we passed through the country," wrote Summers,
"everywhere suffering and distress [could be seen]. Only about half the land is
cultivated, and even the com fields are full of weeds .... The outside world, I am
afraid, will have to render assistance this fall. "32
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Neither Summers nor Jackson remained at his post long enough to oversee
the procurement of such aid. The Second Balkan War ended on I 0 August 1913,
and within three months both men received new commissions for posts outside of
Serbia. The country they left was destitute and penniless, though by the terms of
the Treaty of Bucharest, it received the provinces ofVardar Macedonia, Kosovo,
Metohija, and shared with Montenegro the Sanjak of Novi Pazaar. Its territory and
population nearly doubled, and by June 1914, Serbia was able to put some 200,000
men in the field, backed by an equal number of reserves.D As a result of the two
Balkan Wars, Serbia became a true military power, a fact which contributed greatly
to the outbreak of World War I.

many returned, though it appears the Balkan Wars forced many more Serbs to immigrate to
America. According to one author, a number of Serb veterans were among the striking miners
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its population rose from 2,912,000 to 4,444,000. See Petrovich, vol. II, 603.
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V. Epilogue, 1914
In the wake of the Second Balkan War, Jackson's replacement was Charles
J. Vopicka, a Czech immigrant and businessman from Chicago, Illinois. Although
appointed as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on 11 September
1913, Vopicka did not arrive in Belgrade until January of the following year.
When the minister at last received an audience with Peter, he reported that there
was "much joy among the Serbians, being Slavs, that the United States had
selected a born Slav as her representative. "1 He found Peter "a man of very
distinguished appearance," although "his health was poor and he was then quite
seventy years old." 2 The king entertained Vopicka for more than an hour, and after
parting gestures the minister left Belgrade for Sofia.
Vopicka remained in Bulgaria through the spring of 1914, though on one
occasion he had reason to confer with Pasic. It seems he needed the prime
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minister's help in obtaining some confiscated American property, namely a case of
Iver Johnson shotguns seized by Serbian customs at the outbreak of First Balkan
War. The owner of the guns was an American citizen named Frederick Peters,
owner of an import/export firm in Hamburg, Germany, who had sent the case
directly to a buyer in Salonika. 3 At length Vopicka secured its release, appealing
directly to Pasic in late 1913. 4
On 12 July 1914, Vopicka returned to Belgrade to attend festivities in honor
of the king's birthday. Instead of mirth and revelry, he found the city subdued, its
public buildings draped in ceremonial black. The cause of this was the death of
Russia's chief representative to Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig, an ardent supporter of
Serbia and a close friend of its prime minister, Nikola Pasic. Though the Austrian
Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been murdered just two weeks earlier, Peter's
Russophile court mourned only for Hartwig.
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According to Vopicka, the funeral was a grand affair, and though there were
sworn depositions to the contrary, "ugly rumors were then afloat that Hartwig met
death at the hands of the Austrian minister."6 Whatever the case, by July 1914
Austro-Serbian relations were utterly irredeemable. The murder of the archduke,
believed to have been masterminded in Belgrade, elicited a stem ultimatum from
Vienna. Among other things, Austria demanded that Serbia suppress all antiHabsburg activity within its borders. 7 It also insisted that Austrian officials take
part in the investigation, a clear violation of Serbian sovereignty. Therefore on 25
July Belgrade agreed to virtually all of Vienna's terms, but openly rejected the
presence of Austrian officials on Serbian soil.
To Vopicka this was of little importance. "It seems that Austria wanted war
with Serbia," he wrote, and that regardless of Serbian reparations, the death of the
archduke "was welcomed as a casus belli." 8 Nonetheless, in a private meeting with
Pasic, Vopicka advised the prime minister that he should avoid war at all costs,
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especially when his country "was in no position to engage in fresh hostilities. "9
Pasic's response, however vague, was that he would "do everything he honorabZv
could to avoid war." 10 This, however, did not mean an outright acceptance of the
Austrian ultimatum. By 25 July 1914, Vopicka was in Bucharest, arriving aboard
"the last steamer that left Belgrade before the World War began. "11
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VI. Conclusion
The outbreak ofWorld War I, initiated by Austria in July 1914, brought a
promising decade of Serbo-American relations to a close. In fact, Charles Vopicka
was America's last official representative to Serbia, which in late 191 8 became part
of a triune kingdom encompassing both Croatia and Slovenia. From this point
forward American representatives would be accredited to the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later known as Yugoslavia. As this country soon took
on a unique, geo-political importance, its ties with the United States increased
manyfold.
Thus Serbia's post-war relations with America stood in sharp contrast to
those of 1903-13, when even President Theodore Roosevelt disparaged of contact
with Belgrade. Whatever the case, at the beginning of this period Serbia had little
time (or reason) to ponder the opinions of the United States. The country had just
been rocked by a palace coup, and its new king, Peter I Karadjordjevic, was in dire
need of foreign recognition, particularly from those governments that were of more
immediate importance to Serbia than was the United States. Therefore by August
1903, Peter had sent letters of introduction to each of the European heads of state,
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though "either due to forgetfulness or economy," wrote the American minister John
B. Jackson, "no [such] telegram was sent to the President.. .. "12
One should not infer, however, that Serbia was disinterested in relations
with the United States. On the contrary, Belgrade was acutely aware of America's
expanding influence, especially in commerce, an area in which Serbia had long
been dependent upon Austria-Hungary. If it indeed was to emancipate its own
market, Serbia would have to increase its commercial links with countries outside
of Central Europe, namely Russia, France, Great Britain, and if possible, the
United States. To this end Belgrade concluded a number of commercial
agreements, and in May 1904, Peter informed Jackson that he would "neglect
nothing which may realize or facilitate a closer rapprochement between our two
countries. "13
Whether or not this "rapprochement" meant closer economic ties is open to
debate, but what is certain is that by 1908, Serbian exports began to enter the
American market en masse. That year the United States received over 1.3 million
kg of Serbian fruit and copper. Though only 2. 7 percent of Serbia's total export,
the number would reach a high of 4.6 percent (2. 7 million kg) in 1912. During this
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period there was also a marked increase in imports from the United States.
Starting at just under 1 million kg in 1903, these imports peaked at 2.1 million kg
in 1911. Though a majority were of a colonial nature ( ie. petroleum, coffee, and
tobacco), Serbia did manage to purchase a reasonable quantity of American
machinery. Such striking growth, however, was not due to a greater stateside
awareness of Serbia. It was, rather, the logical outcome of the Austro-Serbian
tariff, or "Pig War" of 1906.
Instigated by Austria, the ill-fated "Pig War" was an attempt at pressuring
the Serbs into economic and political servitude though the use of commercial
sanctions. During its first full year the "Pig War" achieved the desired effect:
Serbia's economy, heretofore dependent upon the Dual Monarchy for a majority of
its trade, suffered a loss of over 40 million dinars. Within twelve months,
however, the Serbs managed to acquire alternate commercial outlets, the most
important being Turkish-held Salonika. Thus by 1907 Serbia was well on its way
to economic recovery, demonstrated by an almost 20 percent increase in total
commerce. Over the next five years, trade with the United States experienced a
similar boom, lasting almost until the outbreak of the First Balkan War.
As for political affairs, beginning in 1906 there was a noticeable increase in
diplomatic contact between Serbia and the United States. In June of that year the
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State Department appointed, for the first time ever, a resident consul-general in
Belgrade. It appears that the new post was created so that the United States could
capitalize on the Austro-Serbian "Pig War" of 1906. The consul-general was
expected, among other things, to alert American firms of new opportunities in the
region. Therefore by 1907, at least three American companies were interested in
Serbia, described optimistically as "a great new field, rich in trade possibilitics." 1-l
Prior to 1906, the State Department had used only vice consuls-general in
Belgrade, though a majority of these men were from countries other than the
United States. From 1903 to 1913, only two of the six men named to the post were
American citizens. One such consul was of Swiss descent; another a Hungarian
Jew who had immigrated to New York.
In addition to the Belgrade consulate, America maintained a representative
of higher rank, a chief of mission known titularly as "envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary." These envoys were solely responsible for diplomatic
contact between Serbia and the United States, often concluding treaties, appearing
at royal functions, and exchanging notes between heads of state. In the decade
preceding World War I, seven men were named to the post, a position requiring an
appointment by the President himself.
1 ~Mooreto
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Apart from Serbia, the envoyship also included the courts of Greece and
Romania. This left American ministers to the region in a unique position,
especially in times of crisis, for they could leave their countries without a break in
diplomatic ties. In 1903 for instance, Minister John B. Jackson left Belgrade in the
wake of a palace coup. Other ministers would do so during the Bosnian
annexation crisis of 1908-09, and during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Besides
personal safety, these men abstained from Belgrade for political reasons, often
instructed to reside elsewhere so as to dispel any "active [American] interest in the
situation[ s]. "15
So what then was America's stake in Serbia, and why did it insist upon
relations with a country so devoid of economic and political influence? The
answer seems to rest in America's new found position as a great power. Fresh
from a war with Spain, in 1903 the United States was under the leadership of
Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent, inimical nationalist who yearned for expansion.
His push for new markets insured that American envoys could be found in such
backwater places as Belgrade, Sofia, and Bucharest. Though some were
aggressive entrepeneurs, trade between the two countries was small and remained
so throughout the pre-war period. America's economic focus therefore was not on
15
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Eastern Europe or the Balkans. On the contrary, American traders favored South
and Central America, China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, all areas more
profitable than Serbia. Political relations from 1903 to 1913 were even less
pronounced, owing in great measure to America's traditional non-involvement in
European affairs. Serbia was simply too remote, too controversial, and the center
of an ongoing rivalry which soon led Europe to war.
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Appendix A
U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Serbia,
1903-1913
name

res.

date apptd.

pres. of cred.

term. of mission

John B. Jackson

NJ

13 Oct. 1902

9 May 1904

13 July 1905

John W Riddle

MN

8 March 1905

7 Mav 1906

23 Jan. 1907

Horace G. Knowles

DE

16 Jan. 1907

I July 1907

4 Feb. 1909

Huntington Wilson

IL

17 Dec. 1908

Spencer F. Eddy

IL

11 Jan. 1909

John R. Carter

MD

25 Sept. 1909

3 May 1910

27 Oct. 1911

John B. Jackson

NJ

12 Aug. 1911

16Jan. 1912

15 Oct. 1913

Charles J. Vopicka

IL

11 Sept. 1913

15 Dec. 1913

17 Dec. 1918

Source: Department of State. Principal Otficers of the Department <~{State and United States Chief<; of
Mission. 1778-1990. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Go\'emment Printing Office. 1991, pp. 164-66.
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AppendixB
U.S. Consuls-General to Bel2rade,
1906-1913*
name

res.

date appt'd

Max\VellK.. Moorhead

PA

22 June 1906

31 March 1908

Robert S.S. Bergh

ND

14 Dec 1908

29 Feb 1912

Maddin Summers

TN

20 Dec. 1911

31 Dec. 1913

Lewis W. Haskell

SC

24 Nov. 1913

17 Sept. 191 S

term. of mission

Notes: (*)The United States did not appoint a resident consul-general until mid-1906.
Source: List of U.S. Consular Officers, 1789-1939, National Archives, Microcopy No.T-587.
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Appendix C
U.S. Vice Consuls-General to Belgrade,
1903-1913.
name

res.

date appt'd

Christian Vogeli

Serbia

I 0 March 1900

I June 1908

Voislav Petrovic

Serbia

I April 1908

April 1909

Samuel Weiss

NY

16Julyl909

unknown

R. Novakovic

Serbia

6 March 1911

unknown

Harry B. Richardson

PA

7Feb.1913

31May1913

E. Jevremovic

Serbia

16 Sept. 1913

5Feb.1915

term. of mission

Source: List of U.S. Consular Officers, 1789-1939, National Archives, Microcopy No.T-587.
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